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Were the last 30 years of feminist law reform activity
around criminal justice misdirected? Or, if not
misdirected, have the efforts been appropriated and
manipulated by the New Right? This commentary
reflects on this history, and on the failures of the
retributive justice project generally, and argues for a re-
examination of both. The discussion focuses on the
tactics of the New Right and on the retributive goals of
some victims' rights organizations as a means of
highlighting the unintended consequences of key
feminist initiatives around violence against women.
Finally, the commentary identifies alternatives to
retribution and a need for careful attention to the wider
implications of all activism.
Est-ce que les trente demi~res ann~es d'activit~s de la
r~forme du droit fdministe, en rapport avec la justice
criminelle, furent mal orientees? Ou, si tel ne fut point
le cas, est-ce que les efforts furent appropri~s et
manipul6s par le nouveau droit? Ce commentaire est
fond6 sur rhistorique de cette r~forme, ainsi que surles
dchecs du projet de justice distributive en g~n6ral; il
soutient queles deux cas n~cessitent un nouvel examen.
La discussion traite des tactiques du Nouveau droit
ainsi que des buts vengeurs de quelques organisations
des droits des victimes comme moyen de souligner les
cons6quences involontaires des initiatives f6ministes
majeures dans la lutte contre la violence envers les
femmes. Finalement, le commentaire identifie les
alternatives A la vengeance et le besoin d'une attention
prudente quant A l'implication plus large de tout
activisme.
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PREFACE
This paper revisits some feminist criminal law reform initiatives,
considers the influence of retriubtive justice values on those initiatives,
and relates both to the increasing significance of the new victims' rights
movement. Although the content is critical of many reforms to the
criminal law attributed to or claimed by the women's movement, the
perspective is feminist,1 and written in a spirit of feminist analysis and
self-examination. It is a broad and somewhat speculative critique, of
necessity simplified, and reliant on the benefit of hindsight. It is an
approach that will provide many opportunities for debate and discussion.
Those moved to agree will find many occasions for refining, developing,
proving, or contesting both the propositions and the support offered for
them. That is one of its goals. The discussion is not intended to be
definitive in either a doctrinal or sociological sense, but rather the
argument, comments, and concerns are offered as a commentary that, to
me, raise some important questions for feminism. My hope is that the
process of asking the questions will spur a search for new directions for
feminist engagement with the criminal law, and a new interest in testing
and re-examining some of our current approaches.
My experiences as an activist and as a lawyer practising criminal
law as a defence counsel and, on occasion, as an advocate for assaulted
women ground this writing. That experience forged my distaste for a
1 Feminism is a varied and evolving philosophy and those who consider themselves to be
"feminist" are a diverse group with a broad range of perspectives. For the purposes of this
comment, feminists and feminism are spoken of as sharing at least two things: first, a recognition of
the systemic and pervasive nature of sex and gender discrimination in our society; and second, a
commitment to transforming society to remove that oppression. In that sense feminism involves a
political, activist dimension. The "feminism" that I claim identifies systemic and pervasive
discrimination and oppression on the basis of class and race as well.
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system2 that processes and reprocesses the same young men-and a few
women-in and out of prisons, while failing to deliver on the promises
made in its name to keep us safe from the harm they do. Of course, that
has always been one of the purposes of the criminal law-to control the
"dangerous classes" and to perpetuate and replicate existing power
relations, but as a feminist, I am increasingly concerned that feminist
ideas and credibility are being appropriated to strengthen an apparatus
that I believe should be dismantled, not supported. At the same time,
the paper is informed by the belief that law reformers and activists must
accept responsibility for the unintended as well as the intended
consequences of our efforts.
Finally, it is obviously a scholar's duty to help to identify and
examine those consequences. Much of my own research and writing has
explored the tensions around the implications of the use of the criminal
law for and against women. This paper is a logical extension from that
foundation.
I. INTRODUCTION
[I]f feminists are to continue their traditional engagement with law, our strategies and
demands should continually be re-examined in the light of experience of law and legal
practices.3
Feminist activism4 around criminal justice issues has been
relatively successful in terms of contemporary social change movements,
although a closer examination reveals that many of the "successes" are
limited to reforms in the legal sphere. Repeal of the most egregious
abuses of traditional rape laws, for example, which made rape within
marriage a legal impossibility and which required evidence to
2 "System" is something of a misnomer, although it is commonly used in this context. I use
"system" in this paper to refer to the investigative, enforcement, prosecution and punitive aspects of
criminal law, procedure, and related institutions.
3 C. Smart & J. Brophy, "Locating Law: A Discussion of the Place of Law in Feminist
Politics," in J. Brophy & C. Smart, eds., Women-in-Law: Explorations in Law, Family and Sexuality
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985) 1 at 18. Although Brophy and Smart urged caution and
close analysis for feminist engagement with law reform, it is interesting that in 1985 the debate was
more concerned with turning to the law at all.
4 Again, there is no agreed upon list of feminist goals, but this paper assumes equality,
assurance of bodily integrity, and freedom from harms inflicted because of gender as basic to a
feminist agenda.
1998]
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corroborate a woman's complaint,S was brought about through feminist
efforts of thirty years ago. The goal was essentially one of formal
equality-to remove those aspects of rape law that treated women
differently than men. These early initiatives were sharply critical of the
legal system generally, and the criminal justice system in particular, but
the nature of that criticism evolved with experience. Gradually, some
feminists began to engage in reform strategies designed to use law for
more pro-active purposes-to use it to shape and change attitudes and
behaviour within the legal system itself and in society as a whole; in
other words, to address institutional and systemic inequality.
For example, subsequent Criminal Code amendments to rape
laws directly address the prevalence of stereotyped reasoning about
women victims of sexual assault, the "rape myths" that founded the
belief that prosecutions should not succeed on the testimony of the
victim alone. The next generation of reforms addressed the problem not
by removing special rules for the prosecution, which had already been
achieved, but by establishing special rules for their defence, as strict
limits were imposed on use of the complainant's prior sexual history.
The form of the limits was also pro-active, as the provisions speak
directly to judges about how they should approach their duties in a
sexual assault trial. The new provisions explicitly prohibit using prior
history evidence to draw an inference that because of that history the
complainant is more likely to have consented to the activity in question,
for example, in an effort to forestall one of the more pernicious of the
rape myths.
This is a fundamental change that strikes a new balance in
criminal prosecutions-the trial is no longer simply a contest between
the state and the accused. Now if a relevant use of prior history is
claimed, the Code requires the judge to balance the right of the accused
to make a full answer and defence to the charge, against the importance
of ensuring that sexual assaults are reported and the need to "remove
from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias" when
considering whether to permit any questioning of the complainant about
the history. Both the content and the tone of these provisions reflect the
influence of feminist involvement with their drafting, and further, reveal
the didactic purpose at their core.6
5 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ss. 274 (corroboration not needed), 275 (recent complaint rule
abrogated) [hereinafter Code].
6 Ibid. s. 276. For a discussion of the feminist lobbying effort that led to this very particular
language and focus see R. Currie, "Update: Bill C-49-The New Rape Law" (March 1992) 12(2)
Jurisfemme (newsletter of the National Association of Women and the Law) 1 at 4.
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There have been other changes and more are hoped for-a
history that amounts to an apparent success story in social
transformation. This success is more apparent than real, however, for
feminists concerned with transforming the unequal power relations that
lie at the heart of the oppression of women. Much of this apparently
pro-active legal activism and legal drafting was, in essence, still reactive.
Sexual violence continued to harm and to control women, the justice
system continued to refuse to respond to and include women's
experience, and the system's key players-police officers, lawyers and
judges--continued to display persistent misogyny and aggressive sexism.
Simple legal reforms were clearly not enough, and the attention of
feminists-particularly, but not only those trained in law, became
committed to more sophisticated efforts; a development which has had
two problematic effects, intended or not. First, feminism became
associated with punitive criminalization strategies; and second, reliance
on the criminal law as a tool of social engineering became increasingly
popular.
Whatever the motive of criminal law reformers, the reality is that
the claims that have been heard or acted upon by legislators and courts,
in contrast with those that have been advanced, are those that strengthen
the criminal justice system as it is. That system does little to serve goals
of equality and security. It dispenses punishment and preserves state
authority so that existing power relations are legitimated and replicated,
by means of a process which was developed to achieve just that effect-
the contest style, adversarial model of guilt determination. That system
is anything but transformative and given the individualistic retribution
ethic at its core, it probably cannot be. This is the dark irony at the core
of feminist criminal law reform efforts.
Feminist activism was engaged originally with criminal law
reform because so much about the criminal justice system was at worst
abusive and at best inattentive to human needs, particularly the needs of
women and victims of violence. Little about the criminal justice system
merited feminist support and much required amendment, particularly
the essentially nineteenth-century patriarchal values that (still) dominate
criminal law doctrine. However, the reform agenda moved beyond
challenging the criminal justice system as a whole, and acquired some
new allies, with their own agendas. One of the most troubling, and most
ubiquitous of the new initiatives is the attempt to use the criminal trial,
and the punishment that it justifies, as an occasion of healing and closure
1998]
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for crime victims.7 This goal is also being relied upon as the justification
for a range of procedural amendments that essentially make convictions
easier to obtain by reducing the trauma of testifying and participating in
the trial process.8 In effect, much of the present reform agenda seeks to
do more (good) with the criminal sanction, not less (harm).
Changes like these raise difficult questions of theory and
practice, and necessitate a pause to reflect on where we have come from
and where that past might be leading. On my analysis, and from my
experience, most of the myriad reforms to criminal law and procedure
that have been implemented in the last quarter-century have lengthened
7 The source of the now ubiquitous proposition that there is a therapeutic component for
victims in successfully confronting their abuser in court is not entirely clear. A relatively early
reference is in a review in Psychology Today of a Chilean study written by psychiatrists assisting
torture victims. Published under pseudonyms, the psychiatrists report that in 39 cases, their clients
experienced valuable catharsis in testifying against their torturers which "channeled the patients'
anger into a socially constructive action." Strikingly, the testimony included the information the
torturers had tried, but failed, to extract, allowing confession to become "denunciation instead of ..
betrayal": A. J. Cienfuegos & C. Monelli, "The Testimony of Political Repression as a Therapeutic
Instrument" (1983) 53 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 43 at 50, reviewed in V. Adams, "Crosstalk" (June
1983) Psychology Today 84. More recently, the value of "confrontation," was given substantial
currency in E. Bass & L Davis, The Courage to Heal (New York: Harper and Row, 1988). The idea
has evolved to the extent that it is frequently discussed in journals devoted to issues such as child
sexual abuse. Two fairly recent series in the Journal of Child SexualAbuse, demonstrate the issues
well, including the position that adversarial proceedings cannot ever be transformed sufficiently to
make "healing an enforceable order." Only two of the six pieces, both by lawyers (of four written by
lawyers), are critical of the proposition that civil litigation can be therapeutic; all were more
cautious about the criminal process, because of the burden of proof, the right of silence, and the
lack of control over the process. The description of how traumatic the process is from the
plaintiff/survivor's perspective is very vivid in the first piece by Penelope. See Penelope, "Suing My
Perpetrator: A Survivor's Story" (1992) 1:2 J. Child Sexual Abuse 121; L.E. Walker, "When an
Incest Survivor Sues Her Father: A Commentary" (1992) 1:2 J. Child Sexual Abuse 127; C.P. Ewing,
"Suing Your Perpetrator: Response to a Survivor's Story" (1992) 1:2 J. Child Sexual Abuse 131; S.
Clute, "Adult Survivor Litigation as an Integral Part of the Therapeutic Process" (1993) 2:1 J. Child
Sexual Abuse 121; M. Mallia, "Adult Survivor Litigation as an Integral Part of the Therapeutic
Process: A Reply" (1993) 2:1 J. Child Sexual Abuse 129; and J.E. Thompson, "Healing is an
Unenforceable Order" (1993) 2:1 J. Child Sexual Abuse 131.
8 For example, see R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475 (concluding that the use of a screen
to shield a young complainant/witness from seeing the accused is constitutionally permissible in view
of the importance of facilitating the giving of evidence by young victims of sexual abuse); and R. v.
L.(D.O.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 (concluding that provisions permitting the use of the videotaped
evidence of young witnesses in sexual abuse cases is constitutional because it makes the
participation in the criminal justice system less stressful and traumatic for young complainants).
The validity of the psychological theory behind these provisions is not undisputed, however, and the
proposition that they serve the "search for truth" is a troubling one in the criminal law context given
the presumption of the truthfulness of the complaint that is implicit. See R. Underwager & H.
Wakefield, "Poor Psychology Produces Poor Law" (1992) 16:2 L & Hum. Behav. 233.
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the reach and sharpened the tools at the system's disposal.9 Whether
seemingly transformative-the emergence of a rights-bearing and
influential "victim"-or merely pragmatically necessary, the recent
innovations in criminal law do not represent a triumph for feminism,
despite appearances. For'the most part, this history has been one of
appropriation and distortion of feminist goals and techniques for
purposes quite other than feminist ones, and of the women's movement
making a virtue out of the necessity of working within an oppressive
system.
The most striking of the reforms-the dramatic new focus on the
rights and needs of crime victims-illustrates the dilemma. The claim is
for more rights for all crime victims, undifferentiated; the reality of what
is heard and- repeated by politicians and mainstream media is quite
different. Only certain victims are attractive to those who benefit from
the politics of criminal law reform,1 0 and only they are recognized as
"real" or "innocent" victims, such as "innocent" children or "good"
mothers. These "real" victims are raised as icons-the poster people of
crime control campaigns-while offenders (male, poor, marginal) are
ever more effectively demonized. It goes without saying that "law and
order" campaigners make no similar efforts against corporate or white
collar malefactors.ll The rights of these "real" victims are zealously
advanced, within trials and elsewhere, and are placed in competition
with-balanced against-those of "criminals," who by definition have
too many rights. Indeed, "criminals" must be subjected to increasingly
9 Others have observed the same trend, which was becoming obvious more than 10 years ago
when incarceration rates began to rise. For example, see M. Mandel, "Democracy, Class and
Canadian Sentencing Law" (1984) 21-22 Crime & Soc. Just. 163. See also L. Snider, "The Potential
of the Criminal Justice System to Promote Feminist Concerns" (1990) 10 Stud. L., Pol. & Soc'y 143
[hereinafter "Potential"]; and L. Snider, "Feminism, Punishment and the Potential for
Empowerment" (1994) 9(1) Can. J.L. & Soc'y 75 [hereinafter "Empowerment"] and accompanying
text at notes 29, 30, infra.
10 This paper argues that the criminal law is a political football that is frequently tossed to
serve right-wing interests. See discussion in Part IV, below.
11 The point has been made so well and so often, it is almost a part of the "common sense" of
critical legal analysis. Some of the best analyses have been feminist. For example, see F. Pearce &
L. Snider, eds., Corporate Crime: Contemporary Debates (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1995); D. Cook, "Fiddling Tax and Benefits: Inculpating the Poor, Exculpating the Rich," in P.
Carlen & D. Cook, eds., Paying for Crime (Milton Keynes, U.K.: Open University Press, 1989) 109;
and D. R. Gordon, The Justice Juggernaut: Fighting Street Crime, Controlling Citizens (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1991). See also H.J. Glasbeek, "Why Corporate
Deviance is Not Treated as a Crime-The Need to Make 'Profits' a Dirty Word" (1984) 22 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 393; J.H. Reiman, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class and
Criminal Justice, 3d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1990); and J. Braithwaite, Inequality, Crime and
Public Policy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
1998]
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harsh punishments in order to demonstrate that the system has taken the
wrong done to their victim, if a "real" victim, seriously. The unworthy,
such as "bad" mothers, "bad" girls, and unruly youth, are never real
victims, on the other hand. Instead, they are subjected to ever more
invasive controls and surveillance, such as the "fink" lines, fraud squads,
and fingerprinting requirements being widely used against welfare
recipients, 12 or the increasingly harsh measures taken against young
offenders.13 In the meantime, social and economic policies that would
reduce crime generally and provide women with the means to improve
their own lives, such as adequate day care or affordable housing, or
youth the reason to live theirs within accepted norms, such as
meaningful work, are scaled back or eliminated entirely.
It was not inevitable that a punitive, retribution-driven agenda
came to dominate criminal law reform and the most publicly accessible
face of the women's movement, but it would have been very difficult to
resist or prevent. Despite a rich literature that critiques punitive
criminal justice initiatives, 14 at the level of popular discourse, where
12 Ontario, for example, is borrowing widely from American jurisdictions in its "get tough on
welfare" strategy. The strategy is widely publicized: C. Mallan, "New get-tough bill on welfare
unveiled today" The Toronto Star (12 June 1997) A13; and N. Pron, "Welfare finger analysis irks
critics" The Toronto Star (20 March 1997) A4. There is more than ideology involved; women on
welfare who are victims of the New Right strategy and who are prosecuted for "welfare fraud" are
very likely to be imprisoned, even when it is clear that the crime was motivated by need: see D.L.
Martin, "Passing the Buck: Prosecution of Welfare Fraud: Preservation of Stereotypes" (1992) 12
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 52.
13 Enforcement efforts against youth, particularly minority youth are producing significant
increases in the numbers of young people in custody: see Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, A
Graphical Overview of Crime and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, May 1996) at fig. 6.12, 146-47 [hereinafter A Graphical Overview of Crime]. Studies
reported in D.P. Cole, et al., Commissioners Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the
Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1995) [hereinafter Systemic
Racism] at 82, 83, 101, 185, demonstrate that intensive policing supported by vigorous prosecution
and efforts to imprison convicted offenders, particularly for even minor drug offences, have
produced sharp disparities in the criminalization of Black youth when compared with white youth.
Media stories illustrate the attitude that youth are dangerous and only punitive responses are
adequate: see T. Claridge, "Teenager gets nine years in stabbing-Case tried in adult court after
judge finds provisions of Young Offenders Act insufficient" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (19
March 1997) A10.
14 To touch on a few, see for example, D. Currie, "Battered Women and the State: From the
Failure of Theory to a Theory of Failure" (1990) 1(2) J. Hum. Just. 77; K. Daly, "Men's Violence,
Victim Advocacy, and Feminist Redress" (1994) 28 L & Soe'y Rev. 777; D.L. Martin, "Casualties of
the Criminal Justice System: Women and Justice Under the War on Drugs" (1993) 6 C.J.W.L. 305;
L. Snider, "Empowerment, supra note 9"; and L. Snider, "Toward Safer Societies: Punishment,
Masculinities and Violence Against Women" (1998) 38 Brit. J. Criminology 1. Others have
effectively critiqued reliance, or over-reliance on legal strategies generally: see G. Brodsky & S.
Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step Fonvard or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa:
[VOL. 36 NO. 1
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hegemonic values are shaped, the retribution claim has either dominated
or at least has been closely associated with feminist claims in the popular
mind. That association-between taking crimes against women
"seriously" and treating offenders punitively-is a troubling
consequence of feminist activism around the victimization of women: an
activism that paralleled and propelled the emergence on the public/
political terrain of "victim" as a new status of personhood and
citizenship. That relationship, between feminist discourse, victimhood
and repressive criminal law reforms, is the reason for this paper, which
will argue that feminist criminal law reform efforts have been subsumed
within, changed and at times (mis)used by an updated version of the
retribution ethic to justify a series of problematic changes to criminal law
and to criminal procedure.
The current political climate is not particularly receptive to ideas
for transformative changes in criminal justice, such as rejection of
retribution as a governing principle, but it is a system that is in need of
transformation nonetheless. The women's movement has the legitimacy
and the political potency to bring one about. That can only happen,
however, if the retributive ethic is reexamined and rejected, reactionary
and simplistic political strategies exposed, and new coalitions and
strategies devised. This paper offers a modest beginning to that project.
II. PROMISES A RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
SYSTEM MAKES BUT CANNOT KEEP
Stripped of moralizing, law exists not only to restrain retribution but to mete it out-and
to mete it out on behalf of individuals whose rights have been violated as well as in the
interests of society as a whole. ... A society that is unable to convince individuals of its
ability to exact atonement for injury is a society that runs a constant risk of having its
members revert to the wilder forms of justice. 15
Susan Jacoby is describing what many in our society believe is the
dominant purpose of the criminal law; that it is essentially about
retribution-as revenge or atonement-offered in the name of security,
in exchange for legitimacy. The promise is that the criminal justice
system will protect citizens and communities, and that it will do so by
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989); B. Cossman, "'Dancing in the Dark': A
Review of Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day's Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step
Fonvard or Two Steps Back?" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 223; J. Fudge, "What Do We
Mean by Law and Social Transformation?" (1990) 5 Can. J.L. & Soc'y 47 [hereinafter "What Do
We Mean?"]; and J. Fudge, "Evaluating Rights Litigation as a Form of Transformative Feminist
Politics" (1992) 7(1) Can. J.L. & Soc'y 153 [hereinafter "Evaluating Rights Litigation"].
15 S. Jacoby, H'ildJustice." The Evolution of Revenge (New York: Harper, 1983) at 10.
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apprehending offenders and meting out "appropriate" measures of
punishment. A corollary to this promise is that when the criminal justice
system fails to keep citizens safe (which is inevitable) and fails to satisfy
the need for recognition of the wrong done (increasingly common), the
system can be, and indeed must be, reformed so that it will mete out
more retribution, and thereby provide more security and an enhanced
sense that justice was done. This justification for preserving retribution
as a basic principle of criminal law was recently acknowledged by the
Supreme Court of Canada, which described retribution as determining
the moral blameworthiness of an offender, by representing "nothing less
than the hallowed principle that criminal punishment, in addition to
advancing utilitarian considerations related to deterrence and
rehabilitation, should also be imposed to sanction the moral culpability
of the offender."16
These promises of morality, protection, and recognition of harm
are false promises. The criminal justice apparatus is about order and its
reproduction, and about maintaining the existing hierarchy of status and
privilege, and only incidentally about crime or morality or the safety of
individual citizens and their communities. It operates most effectively at
the level of the symbolic, by naming individual offenders as morally
defective, and using them as scapegoats, and only incidentally as a useful
tool for community security,17 although at times it is the only and the
most appropriate social institution available. It is also about legitimacy
and, as Jacoby points out, about meting out retribution to enough
offenders in large enough quantities to preserve that legitimacy. When
this expensive and extensive system fails to keep individuals and
communities safe, they are angry and vocal about their disappointment.
In response to that disappointment, and to its political significance,
those who manage the system turn from the complex and difficult (the
security of individuals and their communities) to the symbolic and
possible (the need for recognition of the wrong done). In spurious
satisfaction of that legitimate need to give significance to a harm, the
state offers ever greater levels of and forms of punishment to selected
victims. That more punitive retribution is frequently what is demanded
16 R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 at 556.
17 This purpose of the criminal law in a liberal democracy, and the processes which fulfill it,
have been persuasively chronicled by a number of critical criminologists: see, for example, R.V.
Ericson, Reproducing Order: A Study of Police Patrol Work (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1982); D.J. McBarnet, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (London:
Macmillan, 1981); D. Hay, "Property, Authority and Criminal Law" in D. Hay et al, Albion's Fatal
Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Penguin, 1975) 17; and S. Hall et
aL, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order (London: Macmillan, 1978) at 228.
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begs the question. If revenge and punishment equated with safety and
individual security, the most vengeful societies would also be the safest
and fairest.
In fact, the state has a very limited scope within which to fashion
responses to public concerns about safety and security, particularly when
it does so from within existing criminal justice system paradigms. It can
essentially only draw on the power to define, to name certain conduct as
criminal legislatively, and/or on the power to enforce these definitions
through policing, prosecuting, and punishing. The traditional rationale
guiding both is that a shared morality will be strengthened by and
expressed in the criminal law and that a sense of security and community
will be sustained by the fair and equal enforcement of the laws thus
enacted. As atonement for injury is exacted by the state on behalf of its
aggrieved citizen, the social contract is strengthened. As others witness
the price the wrongdoer must pay, they learn what not to do. These are
limited and limiting responses to the social problems of a liberal
industrial state and it is not surprising that they are not delivering on the
promises made.
The idea that punishment will keep us safe has been around for a
long time, of course, and in the tenets of criminal law, it is known as the
doctrine of deterrence. In essence, it is premised on the assumption that
behaviour is directed by a rather primitive cost-benefit formula. As
rational beings, so the theory goes, citizens know what the law forbids
and may choose to obey or not. If the "cost" of lawbreaking is high
enough, this rational citizen will choose not to break the laws. If, on the
other hand, the "price" is too low, in that the consequences are too
lenient, the law is not a deterrent and the rational citizen will flout it.18
18 The inherent absurdity of such a primitive understanding of behaviour is well understood in
the literature, and even in some courts, but "deterrence" continues to be a potent concept in
popular understanding and in many courtrooms. See generally: J. Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and
Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) [hereinafter Reintegration]; K.C.
Kennedy, "A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory" (Fall 1983) 88 Dickson L. Rev. 1 at
7; and T. Mathiesen, Prison on TriabA CriticalAssessment (London: Sage, 1990). Mr. Justice Josiah
Wood of the British Columbia Court of Appeal has gone farther than most Canadian judges in
questioning the wisdom of the theory of deterrence. In R. v. Sweeney (1992), 71 C.C.C. (3d) 82
(B.C.C.A.), a case of criminally negligent driving causing death, (involving alcohol), he challenged
the prevailing view that long jail sentences would serve as a deterrent in these cases and thus save
lives, and declined to impose a penitentiary term on a deeply remorseful first offender; he was
sentenced to the maximum reformatory term instead. His position did not ever entirely prevail,
however: see R. v. Anderson (1992), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 523 (B.C.C.A.) (five years); and R. v. Lake (23
May 1996), (Ont. C.A.) [unreported] (six years). However, efforts to increase a nine-year sentence
because of the incidence of spousal homicide in Canada were recently rejected by the Ontario Court
of Appeal in R. v. Edwards (1996), 28 O.R. (3d) 54. However, see the criticism of that decision by
Isabel Grant and Debra Parkes, who argue that the sentences meted out in cases of wife abuse are
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This basic thesis has been refined, particularly by feminist theorists who
work within the criminal justice paradigm, to account for the "cost-
benefit" choices made by victims of crime as well. This refinement posits
that if the law is too forbidding and unwelcoming to victims of crime
they will not engage it. If they do not set the law in motion against the
men who use violence against .them, those men will continue to assault
and abuse, because either the "cost" is worth paying (because it is low),
or the risk is worth taking given the unlikelihood of prosecution.
Similarly, if the consequences for this lawbreaking are too lenient,
women will not find it "worth it" to engage the law and men will, again,
not be deterred. 19
There is, of course, some truth in this model for some people in
some circumstances. But of the many difficulties with this theory, the
most serious is that deterrence works very poorly for the crimes that are
of greatest concern to popular conceptions of the criminal law, such as
acts of personal violence. That is so for many reasons. A theory of
rational choice is largely irrelevant to acts motivated by non-rational
impulses and/or produced out of circumstances more compelling than
concern over the possibility of detection and prosecution. Even when
there is some element of choice-perhaps concerning the predisposing
circumstance, for example-fear of punishment is often not an effective
deterrent because the chances of any individual getting caught are very
small.20 Apprehension rates overall are low in cases of unknown
assailants quite apart from the issues around reporting these offences
when assailant and victim are known to each other. State punishment
also lacks legitimacy as a deterrent because of unfair enforcement
too lenient, in "Sentencing for Domestic Attempted Murders: 'Special Interest Pleading'?" (1997) 9
C.J.W.L 196.
19 This idea has had currency for some time. In 1984, Toronto lawyer N. Jane Pepino headed
an inquiry into a shocking crime committed by a man on parole. In justifying her recommendations
about increasing limits on parole-granting in high profile cases, she said: "It is recognized that
public confidence in the justice system is a factor in deterring violent crime, in that increased
confidence in the system should result in increased reporting of offences and more effective
prosecution. Beliefs that sentences are inadequate, that convictions are rarely registered, that the
court process is an ordeal or that early prison release programmes are being abused by recidivists,
lead to an erosion of public confidence in the current justice system that indirectly influences its
effectiveness": Final Report (of the) Task Force on Public Violence Against Women and Children
(Toronto: The Task Force, 1984) at 98. See also discussion in Part III, below.
20 For example,.of the 30,273 reported robberies in 1994-95 (therefore lower than the total
robberies in that year) only 9,545 were cleared by charge or otherwise, yielding a clearance rate of
only 31.5 per cent: Canadian Crime Statistics, 1995 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics,
1995).
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mechanisms, which are over-inclusive of youths and minorities.21
Ironically, this very unfairness deters some victims from bringing
complaints as much as the unfriendliness of the system itself.22
A related, and psychologically and sociologically more
sophisticated assumption, is that of the criminal law as teacher, which is
premised on the supposition that citizens look to the law to learn what
matters in their society. This assumption recognizes that not all harmful
consequences and behaviours are caused by actors making deliberate
choices, but supports the argument that denunciation through
punishment will "teach" the society as a whole that the behaviour is
wrong and thus that it will stop. Again, this assumption rests on some
doubtful premises; first, that values and norms come from the law and
second, that the law's message is respected. In view of unfair and even
abusive enforcement, and actors committing desperate, angry,
"irrational" acts that they may very well understand to be wrong in other
contexts, these lessons are only very imperfectly learned. The lesson
actually taught may simply be that might-in this case the might of the
justice system-makes right, or he who has the biggest stick wins. These
are not lessons that transform violent and desperate behaviours.23
Ultimately, however, the fatal flaw is that the system, as it is, is a
technique for scapegoating. Most "criminals" are never punished, and
of those that are punished, some are punished unfairly-whether
wrongly convicted, or convicted of more than they should be held to
account for, or faced with excessive, inappropriate punishment. In the
result, those most likely to commit the crimes the system pays most
attention to (marginalized young males committing individual acts of
trespass or breaches of drug laws) neither fear nor respect the sanctions.
Moreover, a scapegoating system is by definition arbitrary and more
symbolic than real. The result is that for many potential offenders, the
risk is worth taking if it is adverted to at all. In this sense, then, of
guaranteeing security, the criminal justice system is remarkably
ineffective. In the more important realm of setting the standards and
reinforcing the values essential to a civil society, the arbitrariness and the
21 The extent to which enforcement is racist and stereotype-driven is increasingly well
documented. For an extensive analysis of the phenomenon, see Systemic Racism, supra note 13.
22 That is certainly one of the reasons that some women are so reluctant to access the criminal
justice system when they face violence within their own homes and communities. For a review of
the literature, and a case study, see D.L. Martin & J.E. Mosher, "Unkept Promises: Experiences of
Immigrant Women With the Neo-Criminalization of Wife Abuse" (1995) 8 C.J.W.L. 3.
23 For an historical inquiry that also suggests that this might well be so, see D. Hay, "Time,
Inequality, and Law's Violence," in A. Sarat & T.R. Kearns, eds., Law's Violence (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1992) 141.
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cruelty also work to diminish effectiveness. Techniques that divide,
label, stigmatize, and brutalize, which are the tools of a punishment-
based justice system, and which do so arbitrarily and unfairly, do not
teach us to be gentle, considerate, and responsible.
These failures, both actual and perceived, have not gone
unnoticed and are generating considerable political and public attention.
Unfortunately, much of that attention is being expressed as the need for
more, not less punishment; more, not less retribution, and more ways to
win prosecutions. This campaign for "more" has acquired considerable
potency through the lobbying and media campaigns of the growing
victims' rights movement and its corporate and political allies, a
movement that often allies itself with the goals and rhetoric of the
women's movement. Even a cursory examination of this rhetoric and
these alliances suggests that it amounts to an appropriation of feminist
discourse, a discourse which has itself been changing to support the
greater reach of the criminal sanction and increased use of punishment.
The next two sections briefly consider this story; first, by tracing some
changes in feminist discourse and strategy; and second, by locating some
key feminist claims within the "law and order" agenda.
III. THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT AND FAILURES
OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
[C]urrent sentencing practice for rape may be criticised on two main grounds. First, the
level of punishment often dispensed is inadequate to meet the above objectives, or to
persuade victims that it is worthwhile for them to seek justice through the courts... .24
The contemporary history of the women's movement tells the
story of the abuse and battery of women and children in many contexts.
In terms of widespread engagement with the legal system, that story
begins with a crime that victimizes women almost exclusively-rape.
Rape was one of the first crimes to be subjected to feminist scrutiny and
reform, at least scrutiny that had an effect on laws and practices. The
strategies and perspectives that were developed around it and the
reform of its prosecution and punishment have been influential on all
the reform initiatives that followed, specifically wife abuse, closely
followed by reforms to the prosecution and punishment of the sexual
abuse of children. The strategy that has dominated has been one of
easing prosecution and increasing punishment in the name of
24 Z. Adler, Rape on Trial (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987) at 135 [emphasis
added].
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encouraging victims to participate. As Madame Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6 expressed it in supporting strict limits on access to complainants'
counselling records in sexual assault cases, "society has a legitimate
interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault .... "25 The
underlying assumption is that limits on an accused person's ability to
defend himself against the allegation can be justified because of the
importance of encouraging complaints. The terrible difficulty this poses
institutionally is that the assumption presumes guilt. It presumes that
the complaint is true, the defence spurious, and the trial a mere
demonstration of that "fact." The corollary, equally problematic, is that
once a complaint has been prosecuted the sentence has to be severe
enough that it makes the decision "worthwhile."26 That this approach
should dominate was not inevitable; it was, however, highly likely once
critical and political attention became law-centred in general and
retribution-based in particular.
Initial work by feminists persuasively identified rape not as an act
of rampant sexuality, as it had been seen, but as an exercise of power and
dominance, committed by men because they could and because it
represented the ultimate act of control over women. 27 This insight
resulted in the exposure of the values and myths that informed the
special laws relating to rape, such as the legal impossibility of rape within
marriage, and were the focus of concerted criticism and challenge.
Challenges to the rape/power dynamic and its reflection in doctrinal
rules also led to the identification of the ways that the trials themselves
were brutalizing for complainants and a deterrent to the bringing of
complaints. Rape myths informed the defence of accused rapists and
intrusive and offensive cross-examinations of complainants about their
own sexual histories were the rule. Activists working to raise awareness
of these abuses coined slogans stamping the trials as "second assaults," a
label and a perception that has stuck.28 The evolution was fairly rapid,
2 5 R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 at 504.
26 Supra note 19.
27 S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1975).
28 See L. Madigan & N. Gamble, The Second Rape: Society's Continued Betrayal of the Victim
(New York: Lexington, 1991); and P.Y. Martin & R.M. Powell, "Accounting for the 'Second
Assault': Legal Organizations' Framing of Rape Victims" (1994) 19 L. & Soc. Inquiry 85. Recently,
young men who had been abused as boys and teens by a pedophile-hebophile who fondled them in
exchange for favours such as special access to hockey games and hockey stars, shouted the same
slogan at a judge who sentenced the remorseful man, who is prepared to undergo chemical
castration, to two years less-one-day in jail plus three-years probation. They had hoped for the
(unusual) imposition of the maximum sentence for his offences-ten years. "[Stuckless] hurt every
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moving from a critique of patriarchy expressed in the criminal law, to
analyses questioning the efficacy of the criminal law as a tool to assist
women. At this point, analyses and strategy choices began to diverge.
The analysis that was most successful, if measured on the basis of legal
changes achieved, or in terms of impact on popular discourse, addressed
the system on its own terms. The sexist, patriarchal attributes of the
criminal law and its limited perception of women were constructed as
barriers to obtaining convictions. Similarly, the sexist beliefs of
prosecutors and judges who sought and imposed relatively light
sentences for most sexual assaults-an offence which covers the range
from touching to rape-were categorized as trivializing the traumas
endured by women who had not suffered the paradigmatic rape by a
brutal stranger. For these feminists, reform initiatives aimed at
supporting complainants fairly quickly evolved into developing means to
ease the road to convictions and to increase penalties.
There are, of course, many feminisms. Others have conceived of
the role of law differently, and opposed this emphasis on a
criminalization approach to oppressive and coercive sexual exploitation.
Because of that concern they closely examined the claims and the
outcomes, a step that in my view should be an integral part of any
reforming/transforming strategy. In one such piece of work, sociologist
Laureen Snider examined the campaign that in Canada led to redefining
the separate crimes of rape and indecent assault into one offence of
sexual assault, with a range of punishments. 29 She documents the failure
in the mid-1980s of the progressive or liberalizing aspects of the reforms
sought in regard to sexual assault, and the implementation of only those
reforms that made conviction easier or sentences longer. The only
progressive successes in this initiative were (temporarily) halting the
creation of offences related to the sexual conduct of "children" (persons
under 18) and pornography. The difficult question her analysis
highlights is how can a reform be counted as both feminist and a success
one of us and today you did the exact same goddamned thing. You did us worse today than he ever
did," shouted one: G. Oakes, "Sex abuser jailed less than 2 years. Victims of ex-Maple Leaf Gardens
worker outraged" The Toronto Star (28 October 1997) Al. The Crown successfully appealed the
sentence, arguing that because of the number of victims, Stuckless' case constitutes "the worst
offender and the worst offence" and thus merits the Code-maximum: D. Downey, "Stuckless should
serve 10 years, Crown argues. Appeal court asked to impose maximum penalty on ex-Gardens
employee who pleaded guilty to sexual assault on boys" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (26 June
1998) A10. The Ontario Court of Appeal increased the sentence to six years (less time-served) and
overturned the term of probation, as well as the mandatory castration: T. Tyler, "Predator's term
raised to 5 years. But appeal court quashes 3-year probation in Gardens sex case" The Toronto Star
(12 August 1998) A4. The increased sentence represents a return to an outdated notion of general
deterrence.
29 "Potential," supra note 9.
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when it strengthens an unequal and unfair apparatus, particularly when
the available evidence suggests that it has done so without producing
either more safety or more equality?3 0
Snider's critique, and others like it,1 which raise fundamental
questions about alliances with law's power are raised with even greater
urgency in the case of wife abuse. Rape and sexual assault are too
common, but they are not commonplace. Unfortunately, that is just
what the scope of domestic violence is-it approaches the commonplace.
As such, it has long been a question of grave concern for the women's
movement and now, apparently, for governments and policymakers.
With wife assault, as with rape, the initial focus of feminist analysis was
on the gendered relationships that produce and sustain it, a focus that
evolved for the majority into an uneasy alliance with the criminal justice
system. And, as with rape, there are feminists who are critical of this
alliance. 32
The Battered Women's Movement has been working to alleviate
and eradicate wife battering for all of the thirty years of the
contemporary "wave" of feminist activism, and most of its efforts and
strategies have been local and grassroots. Shelters and transition houses
have been formed, counseling and support offered, and only latterly has
there been direct engagement with criminal law. That is so, in part,
because battered women have not wanted to add law to the painful and
destructive forces in their lives and their counsellors and advocates have
understood that. It is also because the legal remedies available were,
and frequently still are, partial, patronizing, and punitive. Early work
documented failures in policing in particular with depressing regularity.
For example, a survey of Wisconsin women, free of violence for at least
one year, found many of them dissatisfied with police response. Their
concerns are typical of those documented in the literature throughout
the common-law world-the police response was invasive, inappropriate,
and ineffective. Typically women call police for immediate protection in
fear of their lives, but also for support. The women in the Wisconsin
study resented the police orientation toward treating their call as a
disturbance that had to be defused, and the time spent talking to the
30 Ibid. For a further critique by Snider of the use of the criminal sanction, see
Empowerment," supra note 9. For a more general critique of reliance on law see "What Do We
Mean?," supra note 14; and "Evaluating Rights Litigation," supra note 14.
31 "Potential,"supra note 9.
32 S. Maidment, "The Relevance of the Criminal Law to Domestic Violence" (1980) J. Soc.
Welfare L. 26; Currie, supra note 14; J. McCord, "Deterrence of Domestic Violence: A Critical
View of Research" (1992) 29 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 229; and Martin & Mosher, supra note 22.
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batterer while ignoring them. They also identified the failure to record
the occurrence in police records at all, when charges were not laid, as
problematic. Although a prime police motivation for this practice was to
avoid discipline for negligence or, more recently, for failing to follow
mandatory charging policies, the practice had the effect of weakening
the woman's credibility in subsequent incidents.3 3  Other studies
documented the ways that wife assaults receive police attention that
downplays the seriousness of the violence by locating it within the
disguise of a "domestic dispute," rather than as assaults in progress.
This characterization was reported as leading some officers to
intentionally delay in hopes that "arguments" will have cooled down by
the time of their arrival. When arrests were made, they are often not for
the assault itself but for resisting arrest, public nuisance or drunknness
cases.34
If that has changed (the record is varied), it is because of
feminist activism and political alliances. Feminists around the world
identified and addressed the failures of the justice system in regard to
wife abuse in remarkably consistent ways. The scope of the problem of
battering and the lack of resources to assist battered wives was usually
the first concern, but the failure of police and justice officials to
acknowledge the seriousness of the harm and act to remedy it follow
closely. It seems then that an almost irresistible pressure drove the
movement toward criminal justice reforms and solutions, and to make
use of "law and order" arguments to ensure that criminal justice actors
will become involved35 That is, the focus became devising strategies,
techniques and arguments based on the need to make prosecutions
easier and punishment more severe. One of the most common
responses was to implement "mandatory charge/no drop" policies for
police and prosecutors. In Canada recently, that process has been
escalating and the language of "zero tolerance" has been added to the
33 L.H. Bowker, "Police Services to Battered Women: Bad or Not So Bad?" (1982) 9 Crim.
Just. & Behav. 476.
34 N. Oppenlander, "Coping or Copping Out: Police Service Delivery in Domestic Disputes"
(1982) 20 Criminology 449.
35 The phenomenon was well documented; in particular see Currie, supra note 14; Martin &
Mosher, supra note 22; G.A. Walker, "The Conceptual Politics of Struggle: Wife Battering, the
Women's Movement, and the State" (1990) 33 Stud. Pol. Econ. 63, and G.A. Walker, Family
Violence and the Women's Movement: The Conceptual Politics of Stniggle (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1990).
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discourse around the need to improve-as in increase-criminal justice
initiatives around woman abuse.36
This adoption of, or adaption to, the goals and language of a
retribution-based justice system has permeated feminist discourse all
over the world. Similar attitudes are apparent in a recent study of the
legal system's response to wife assault in New Zealand,37 the country
that pioneered alternative justice models in the Family Group
Conference.3 8 The authors were part of the University of Waikato
Domestic Protection Team and carried out research into the experiences
of battered women with the justice system, particularly with "domestic
protection orders" and the ineffective response of the justice system to
repeated breaches of these orders. They identified a wide gap between
the realities of women's experiences of violence in their homes and the
"minimisation, trivialisation, and victim blaming" frequently
encountered from both the family court and the criminal justice system.
That all three occur in criminal courts is undeniable. However, in this
study, evidence that these denials of women's experience were occurring
was found in an equation that balanced the measure of judicial
"recognition of harm" against the length of the prison sentence imposed.
The reluctance of judges to impose prison sentences in cases of serious
violence-when it would impact adversely on the family as a whole-was
identified as a hallmark of the "gap" between the reality of the level of
harm and judicial blindness to it. Judges who considered that the fact
that the accused was a first offender, that he had taken "steps" about his
36 See Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, Changing the Landscape: Final Report of
the Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women (Ottawa: The Panel, 1993) (Co-chairs: P.T. Marshall
& M.A. Vaillancourt) at 23-25; and Task Force on the Sexual Abuse of Patients, The Final Report of
the Task Force on the Sexual Abuse of Patients: An Independent Task Force Commissioned by the
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (Toronto: The Task Force, 1991) (Chair: M.
McPhedran); and Domestic Abuse: Toward an Effective Legal Response (Edmonton: Alberta Law
Reform Institute, 1995). The use of teams of prosecutors and courts especially dedicated to the
prosecution of wife abuse is also growing. One of the first in Canada was in Winnipeg. The
experiment is described by E.J. Ursel, "The Winnipeg Family Violence Court" in M. Valverde, L.
MacLeod & K. Johnson, eds., Wife Assault and the Canadian Criminal Justice System: Issues and
Policies (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 1995) 169.
37 R. Busch, N. Robertson & H. Lapsley, "The Gap: Battered Women's Experience of the
Justice System in New Zealand" (1995) 8 C.J.W.L 190.
38 The acceptance of this traditional Maori approach to offenders into the New Zealand legal
system dealing with youthful offenders is well set out by parish priest and prison chaplain Jim
Consedine: Restorative Justice: Healing the Effects of Crime (Lyttelton, N. Z.: Ploughshares, 1995). It
has been used in a pilot project in Newfoundland and Labrador in cases of family violence. The
pilot is described by L. Macleod in conversation with J. Pennell and G. Burford, "Family Group
Conferencing: A Community-Based Model for Stopping Family Violence" in Valverde, MacLeod,
Johnson, eds., supra note 37, 198.
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drinking problem, that the complainant had forgiven him, and that jail
would cost the accused his job, were criticized for relying on these
factors in deciding not to incarcerate. From a perspective that equates
recognition of harm with the length of a prison term, it is doubtful that
anything would be recognized as justification for a non-custodial term.
The fact that there had been abuse and that there had been a breach of a
protection order per se determined the appropriate outcome, with no
serious consideration of, or reference to, individual factors or the
interests of and wishes of the woman herself.39
There is almost an element of cynicism, or, at the least,
investigator bias, around studies such as this. That is, feminist
investigators are expecting to see that the criminal justice system is
responding inadequately to woman abuse. Through this lens, sentences
are almost inevitably too lenient, and prosecutions too difficult.40 The
alternative bias, is to measure effectiveness on the basis of the severity of
the punishment imposed. On this measure, criminal justice responses
that are not punitive are seen to be unresponsive to victims'/women's
harms.41
39 Consendine, supra note 38 at 214. This narrow vision of what represents an appropriate
response to battering is very widespread. We documented its roots and extent in Martin & Mosher,
supra note 22.
40 This approach also contributes to an almost inevitable cynicism. For example, see M.
Landsberg "Mother fights for new trial in killing of daughter" The Toronto Star (7 November 1992)
J1. The column recounts the mother's efforts sympathetically in a case where a jury acquitted the
accused and the prosecution could find no error of law justifying an appeal. Landsberg describes
the trial as "the usual blame-the-victim sexist circus that has made many women deeply cynical
about the possibility of justice in the courts" as if that explains it all-and for some it does. More
difficult are the challenges that stem from the practice of a feminist research method. See C.
Armstead, "Writing Contradictions, Feminist Research and Feminist Writing" (1995) 18 Women's
Stud. Int'l F. 627.
41 The equation of prison sentence with recognition of harm generally is also widespread: see
Grant & Parkes, supra note 18. It was reitereated recently at an inquest into the murder of Arlene
May and suicide of her abuser, Randy lies, when the research of Ottawa consultant Richard Gill
was reported on. Gill was commissioned by the Department of Justice to review the hastily enacted
"Criminal Harassment" provisions in the Code. His report was critical, measured against the
granting of bail and imposing of sentences of imprisonment, as criteria for determining gender bias
and sensitivity to women's safety by the judiciary. Fifty-five per cent of those arrested were released
on bail, while 81 per cent of those convicted did not receive a sentence of imprisonment. He is
reported as testifying at the May-lies inquest, that "judges are insensitive to criminal harassment
and there is a lack of understanding. Weak sentences are imposed and jail is a rarity." The
difficulty with this conclusion is the assumption that jail equates understanding and lack of gender
bias. The study was not able to equate the prosecution and sentencing practices to outcomes for
victims, and did not consider other options for addressing stalking and harrassment other than
criminalization. The latter conclusion was based on an assumption that all incidents of harrassmcnt
were alike in severity and risk, although no evidence was offered to support it: W. Darroch, "Justice
system gender biased, research claims" The Toronto Star (15 April 1998) B4.
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The issue of how to measure system responsiveness, when the
system itself is so flawed, is not a simple one. That is particularly so
when issues of race and gender intersect, such as in the Aboriginal
community. This is a community that as a whole is served badly by the
criminal justice system. Racist, patronizing ignorance marks the relation
of the justice system to Aboriginal men, women, and youth alike.42
However, a focus on the system's failures generally can mask and mute
its particular failure to protect women. The power of retribution to
appear to redress this imbalance is unmistakeable. Emma LaRocque, of
the Department of Native Studies, University of Manitoba, rejects any
"sympathy" for the victimized history of Aboriginal male offenders as
misplaced and a means to perpetuate the violence against Aboriginal
women and children. Her espousal of significant punishment of
Aboriginal men who abuse Aboriginal women as a measure that the
harms caused are understood by the wider society to be significant,
demonstrates clearly the power of the retribution model. 43 LaRocque is
unflinching: "if individuals are not capable of personal responsibility and
moral choices ... then they are not fit for normal social engagement and
should be treated accordingly." 4 4 On the question of the sentences
imposed, LaRocque argues that first they are "wantonly lenient" and
that that lenience is not only wrong in itself, but that it perpetuates
sexual violence against women. Her concern is expressed in language
that is replicated daily by "law and order" proponents:
42 See C. LaPrairie, "Community Justice or Just Communities?: Aboriginal Communities in
Search of Justice" (1995) 37 Can. J. Criminology 521; C. LaPrairie, "The Role of Sentencing in the
Over-representation of Aboriginal People in Correctional Institutions" (1990) 32 Can. J.
Criminology 429; D. Ellis & D. Beaver, The Effects of Formal Legal and Traditional Interventions on
Women Abuse in a First Nations Community (Toronto: LaMarsh Research Programme, York
University, 1993); Manitoba, Aboriginal Justice Inquiry, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of
Manitoba (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1991), vol. I, "The Justice System and Aboriginal People" c.
4, "Aboriginal Over-Representation," and vol. II, "The Deaths of Helen Betty Osborne and John
Joseph Harper" (Commissioners: A.C. Hamilton & C.M. Sinclair). Similar tensions operate within
Black communities: R. Tong, "Black Perspectives on Women, Sex and the Law," in R. Tong,
Women, Sex and the Law (London: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984) 153 at 170-71; A. Mama, The
Hidden Struggle: Statutory and Voluntary Sector Responses to Violence Against Black Women in the
Home (London: London Race and Housing Research Unit, 1989) at 174, concerning community
loyalties; S.L. Miller, "Unintended Side-Effects of Pro-Arrest Policies and their Race and Class
Implication for Battered Women: A Cautionary Note" (1989) 3 Crim. Just. Pol'y Rev. 299; and D.
Hawkins, "Devalued Lives and Racial Stereotypes: Ideological Barriers to the Prevention of Family
Violence Among Blacks" in R.L. Hampton, ed., Violence in the Black Family: Correlates and
Consequences (Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1987).
43 E. D. LaRocque, "Violence in Aboriginal Communities," in M. Valverde, et al, supra note
37, 104.
4 4 Ibid. at 109.
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When all is said and done, what of the victim? Where is the help for her? Where is the
concern for her rehabilitation?
The whole judicial process reflects privileged, white male definitions and experience, It
also reflects tremendous na'vet6-often found in white liberal social workers,
criminologists and justices. These lenient sentences are consistent with the growing
horrification of rapists and child molesters as "victims." Today there is persistent
sympathy for sexual offenders with little, if any, corresponding concern for the real
victims.45
IV. THE NEW RIGHT COALITIONS
Canadians deserve to feel that they and their families are safe in their homes, at work, at
school, on the street and in their communities. We want to live in a country where our
children can play in the park, go to school, and grow up without fear. And we want a
justice system that does more to protect law-abiding citizens than it does criminals.
Canadians want a country where we can look to the future, instead of over our
shoulders. 46
Social, legal, economic, political, cultural-none of these forces
operate alone in a society or without influencing each other, and that is
true of the the criminal justice issues that have concerned the women's
movement. As the failures of patriarchal, retributive justice are
identified as failures to serve women and children, they become an issue
for the women's movement. But, at the same time, they become part of
different agendas and victimized women and children become the
justification behind political opportunism and appropriated
expectations. Whether opportunistic or sincere, there has been a
proliferation of misleading but successful "law and order" campaigns led
by new right politicians and by the new alliances between victim's groups
and the corporate sector-campaigns that are highly effective in
influencing both popular discourse and legislative agendas. Similarly,
whether because of deliberate appropriation or the emergence of a
dominant discourse, an examination of the rhetoric of these campaigns
reveals how significant the role of the victim/woman has become. All the
campaigns stress the need to better serve (real) victims, all decry
violence against women, all cite an unresponsive, ineffective and overly
45 Ibid. at 110 [emphasis in original].
4 6 P. Manning, A Fresh Start for Canadians, 3d ed. (Calgary: Reform Party of Canada, 1997) at
14 [hereinafter A Fresh Start].
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lenient criminal justice system, and all boast "partnerships" between
victims, corporations, and concerned politicians.47
Two key claims are dominating contemporary "law and order"
rhetoric-and both draw from and in turn influence feminist criminal
law strategies. The first claim is that crime is "spiralling out of control,"
a proposition which feeds on our fears about violence in general and
street crime in particular. The second is that the criminal justice system
is unable to deal with this burgeoning crime threat-because the system
is too "soft" on crime, and too unresponsive to crime's victims. Both
claims are exacerbated by media coverage of street crime that results in
a significantly distorted understanding of the scope of the problem.48
That exaggeration in turn serves other interests. Indeed, fear is a growth
industry. Marketing schemes for cell phones, for example, present these
devices as essential particularly for women's security and contribute to
the common sense that it is "dangerous out there."49
The second claim points to an excess of rights for criminals and a
dearth of rights for victims as a problem in urgent need of a solution.
This assertion exacerbates the fear of crime generally as it plays on a
sense of helplessness felt by those cast in the role of crime victim and on
the sense of grievance experienced by large segments of society for being
denied important entitlements, or rights. High-profile stories about the
effect of constitutional rulings resulting in the dismissal of criminal
prosecutions, or favouring the rights of the accused, are repeated
endlessly and commented upon widely, thus contributing to a sense that
47 For example, the Reform Party platform, under the promise of making the "streets safe
again" is to: "Enact a Victim's Bill of Rights that puts the rights of law-abiding Canadians ahead of
those of criminals; Reform the criminal justice system to provide you with safer communities, safer
streets, and safer homes; Hold a binding referendum on the return of capital punishment; Repeal
the Liberals' costly firearm registry (Bill C-68) and replace it with meaningful laws to fight the
criminal use of firearms; Reform the parole system and abolish early release for first-degree
murderers; Replace the Young Offenders Act with measures that hold young criminals accountable
for their actions; Pursue crime prevention through social policies that strengthen families and
communities": ibid.
48 See supra notes 17-20.
49 Media reports reinforce the fear, as reports of who is at greatest risk cloud the issue of how
great that risk is, overall. To be the most vulnerable to a threat that is highly unlikely to materialize,
or if it does is likely to be minor and manageable, is quite different from being at high risk of being a
victim of a dangerous and prevalent threat. The latter message is dominating in the case of the risk
of crimes against women, even though reports of spousal assault dropped 7 per cent from 1993 to
1996: K. Makin, "Young women warned of assault. Living common law with mate under 25
increases risk of attack, Statscan finds" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (29 May 1998) A8. Seniors
are also very fearful, and offences against them arouse considerable public outrage: D. Roberts,
"Attack on elderly pair in their home stirs rage. Police in Winnipeg fear crminals are seeking out
seniors as easy robbery targets" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (9 December 1997) A6.
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the justice sysem is failing ordinary people50 This second concern
resonates widely. Criminal courtrooms are not victim-friendly places.
Adversarial contests that begin with the legal presumption of innocence
put the complainant witness in the position of having to prove "her"
case, and make her subject to challenges to her credibility, competence,
and sincerity-as a matter of legal principle.51 However, they are even
less friendly toward accused persons, where in spite of the legal
presumption of innocence, most accused are seen as de facto
guilty-and must affirmatively prove their innocence or be
convicted52-and risk being perceived as abusing their rights by the mere
50 See, for example, both R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (striking down provisions limiting
cross-examination of sexual history, that were known inaccurately, but enduringly, as the "rape
shield" law) and R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (staying criminal charges for a failure to prosecute
within a reasonable time), generated widespread concern and controversy. The women's movement
lobbied successfully for a legislative response to Seaboyer see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
Cases with less widespread implications also receive considerable attention, and often reflect the
popular view that the system is failing. See, for example, D. Roberts, "Manitoba murder suspect
freed because of RCMP mistakes" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (29 April 1998) A17. A second
degree murder charge was stayed because the only evidence the RCMP had that the accused man had
murdered a young woman was in a confession that was inadmissable because of the failure of police
to allow him to call his lawyer. The victim's family are reported as "having lost faith in the justice
system." The victim's sister is reported as saying: "All the family's faith was put into the justice
system and they're not going to be able to do anything?" See also W. Darroch, "'My stores held up
20 times.' Murder victim's brother blames Young Offenders Act for crimes. Tom Ambas says his
brother's killer should have been in jail" The Toronto Star (5 December 1997) D8.
51 This reality is particularly poignant in cases of child abuse, when children face apparent
disbelief. A judge of the Ontario Court General Division recently urged police and prosecutors to
reconsider prosecutions based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of very young children, or of
older chldren describing events that took place years in the past. Mr. Justice David Humphrey, in
dismissing a charge, expressed a sense of frustration that may well be widely shared: "I wish
somebody in authority with a modicum of common sense would put a stop to this nonsense and
would make the well-being of the child the paramount issue. Tell the child, the parents, the
therapist and the social worker the facts of life in the real world. Tell the the child that they are
believed, but there is simply not enough evidence to prosecute. That way, the child, as I say, will not
be victimized probably for the second time, and will be able to maintain their dignity and integrity,
and not be led to believe that our justice system is, in fact, unjust": R. v. Brooks (25 March 1998),
(Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) [unreported] at 4 (transcript).
52 The family of the murdered girl who was so disappointed that the charges were dismissed
because of an inadmissible confession, had obviously concluded that the police had arrested the
"right" man and that his involuntary confession was "true": Roberts, supra note 50. Equally
obvious, not every person that the police charge, or who confesses, is, "in fact" guilty as wrongful
convictions attest, but that is rarely a view expressed by victims or survivors whose need for a
resolution make them particularly likely to believe the police version. See also R.V. Ericson, "The
Decline of Innocence" (1994) 28 U.B.C. L. Rev. 367.
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fact of denying their guilt and defending themselves.53  In fact,
courtrooms are only at all welcoming to the justice system's
habitu6s-lawyers, police officers, judges, and courthouse personnel, but
this is a symmetry not generally appreciated by crime victims and their
advocates. Much of the contemporary reform agenda is based on these
perceptions of inequity, both at the level of the dominant discourse, and
concretely. Complainants in criminal proceedings are almost universally
identified, and self-identify as "victims," which begs the (legal) question
of whether a crime was actually committed.5 4 Complainants also identify
the accused as a killer, a rapist, an abuser-which begs the essential
question of whether he or she actually committed the act in
question-and wonder aloud why a "killer" has more rights than they
have.55
In an attempt to address and to redress these inequities, victims
are claiming, successfully, the right to be heard in court on a variety of
motions, with counsel, and otherwise to influence directly the course of
trials.5 6 More and more energy and concern is being consumed by
demands based on these positions, which are dominating much of law
reform.S7 That economic and social insecurity are more likely sources
53 S. Skurka, "Two Scales of Justice: The Victim as Adversary" (1993) 43 Crim. L.Q. 334,
discussing the general concern in the context of the use of "Victim Impact" statements; and see A.
N. Young, "Two Scales of Justice: A Reply" (1993) 45 Crim. L.Q. 355.
54 For one example of many, see K. Pittaway, "Sex assault: would you press charges? Seek
justice in a sex-assault case, and your life is on trial. We're not even close to balancing the rights of
victim and accused" (October 1997) 70:10 Chatelaine 74.
55Ibid.
56 See D.L. Martin, "Rising Expectations: Slippery Slope or New Horizon? The
Constitutionalization of Trials in Canada," in J. Cameron, ed., The Charter's Impact on the Criminal
Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 87 [hereinafter "Rising Expectations"]. Victims' groups
are now also engaging the court process to enforce victims' rights generally: see R. Mackie, "Crime
victims to sue province. Justice system failed, Ontario women say" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail
(12 June 1998) All.
57 The changes encompass the entire criminal justice system (many of them long overdue and
neccessary, others are more problematic-the issue is the extent of the change). Evidence law has
been reformed to remove spousal privilege in cases of offences against children, corroboration
requirements have been removed and cross-examination of complainants in sexual assault cases
restricted; new offences have been developed, particularly involving prostitution, pornography and
child sexual abuse; new policies concerning violent offences against women and children such as
mandatory charge/no drop policies have been developed, and the establishment of specialized
police and prosecution teams for investigating and prosecuting these offenses are commonly
promised if not provided. Concerns that preliminary inquiries, which require that a victim/witness
testify twice (difficult for some in itself), and thus face cross-examination over differences, if any, in
the two accounts, and that victims are subjected to "abusive, unduly prolonged and inappropriate
questioning" are the subject of a Department of Justice reform package to limit the right to a
preliminary inquiry, and to restrict cross-examinations: see K. Makin, "Curb sought on court
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for the fears and anxiety being articulated in post-industrial societies
may be true, but "crime" (undifferentiated and unexamined) is a much
more convenient and useful peg to pin it on for many interests. It is also
an easier one to accept; this culture is very accepting of the "right" to
exploit labour and resources in an untrammelled way, and claims that
high unemployment and starvation wages are contributing to a general
lack of security are not resonating.
A closer examination of these propositions-that crime is out of
control and the justice system is as well-suggests something more
complex. On the key claim that violent crime is increasing, a recent
occasional paper, from a right-wing think tank, entitled Streets of Fear
The Failure of the Canadian Criminal Justice System,5 8 illustrates how the
crime card is played by political interests. The paper asserts simply that
the increase is occurring at an "appalling" rate. This proposition is by
now so imbedded in the public mind that it apparently needs no support.
The balance of the discussion flows from this "fact" with a predictable
litany of needed get tough reforms. However, rather than demonstrating
a troubling increase, crime rates generally have declined steadily for the
past several years. Indeed, this is the pattern in the United States as
well, not surprising given aging populations.
Basic analysis of the rate of violent crime is illustrative.
Increases in the past of this measure (violent crime rates have also
declined recently) has been the subject of the most concern. Although
for the past five years this rate has also remained steady, or shown a
decline, the rate of violent crime almost doubled between 1977 and
1992. However, when the content of that statistic is examined, it
becomes apparent that over half-58 per cent-of the violent crimes
committed in 1992 did not involve weapons or serious physical injury.59
In other words, it is reasonable to conclude that a good deal of non-
serious physical contact and confrontation is being counted as "violent"
crime, which is something that is more a matter of social construction
than any objective measure of threat. Simply put, a change in perceiving
and thus counting this type of behaviour is responsible for much, if not
all, of the reported increase, and not an increase in what was counted as
hearings. Defence lawyers call Ottawa plan to curtail preliminary inquiries an assault on jury
system" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (9 December 1997) Al. Sentences are much longer for those
selected for exemplary punishment: see generally Martin & Mosher, supra note 22.
58 P.T. Brode, Streets of Fear The Failure of the Canadian Criminal Justice System (Toronto:
Mackenzie Institute, 1993) at 4 [hereinafter Streets of Fear].
59 Canadian Crime Statistics, 1992 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics
Canada, 1992).
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violence in 1977.60 Whether or not it is a good thing to now include in
the violent crime rate behaviour that which was previously not reported
to police, from schoolyard bullying to acquaintance-rape and wife abuse,
it is misleading to fail to take these perceptual and rhetorical changes
into account when determining or discussing apparent increases. It is
also important to keep them in mind when trying to understand the
continued high level of fear of crime as well. Encouraging the use of the
criminal sanction in response to behaviours previously dealt with by
informal mechanisms has a range of consequences, as the writing of
Streets of Fear demonstrates. One of the more troubling consequences is
that social trust and cohesion and confidence decline in the face of
exaggerated fears of our neighbours, and as a result we are increasingly
willing to support draconian crime-control measures, and, indeed,
demand them. The other is that we lose the will and the skill to respond
to slights and wrongs and harms ourselves, through social and
community resources. This is not simply a case of media exaggeration
and inaccuracy. Indeed, the mainstream press has for some time
included stories about the fear of crime persisting in the face of declining
rates of crime in their reporting.61 Other interests and influences are
maintaining and utilizing this focus on the crime question. One such
interest is the corporate agenda.
Corporations have been piqued by the potential in the Victim's
Rights Movement-which has itself been professionalized and
"corporatized"-both trends which institutionalize and entrench
60 It is not difficult to see how these perceptions are formed. A full page spread in a section of
the paper directed toward high school students is headlined, "Fear in the schoolyard" and is sub-
headed, "Are teenagers becoming more violent?" in a recent Toronto Star feature. The opening
paragraph describes a teenager stabbed in the washroom by her ex-boyfriend, and an eight-year-old
with her nose bloodied for refusing to kiss a classmate: The Toronto Star (12 May 1997) A26. The
impact of this type of coverage is substantial, and is a significant component of how experiences are
characterized-crime versus bullying, for example: see J.V. Roberts & A.N. Doob, "Sentencing and
Public Opinion: Taking False Shadows for True Substances" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 491; and
L. M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History (New York: Basic, 1993) c. 20. For an
explanation of how the media contributes to an exaggerated fear of crime in society, see J.V.
Roberts & A.N. Doob, "News Media Influences on Public Views of Sentencing" (1990) 14 L. &
Hum. Behav. 451.
61 The refusal of individuals and communities to act on the declining rates is occasioning
considerable commentary: see F. Butterfield, "Crime Keeps on falling, but Prisons Keep on Filling"
The New York Times, Week in Review (28 September 1997) 1; M. Campbell et al., "Shakedowns in
the schoolyard. Youth crime may not be rising but bullies are getting more sophisticated and
brutal" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (4 October 1997) Al; and K. Kenna, "Fall in murder rate
cold comfort for victim's loved ones. All-American boys' slayings spark outcry for death penalty.
Americans are not persuaded by statistics. They are persuaded by the extraordinary event or the
extraordinary crime" The Toronto Star (7 October 1997) A10.
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positions. One of the oldest and most well known of these groups,
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), is very well integrated into the
corporate mainstream, while it functions as a significant small business
in its own right. In 1995, MADD Canada had revenues in excess of $2.3
million, and expenses of just over $2.2 million. Originally, and
continuing to be, an American phenomenon, it is now registered as a
national charitable organization in Canada, with local chapters in several
provinces, primarily in large population centres-sixteen out of twenty-
one are in Ontario. MADD'S alliances with the financial and corporate
sector are substantial and explicit. The annual statement names
"official" partners including Allstate Insurance and the Bank of
Montreal; "corporate" partners including Hallmark, Shoppers Drug
Mart, and Travelodge; and an associate partnership with Nissan.62
The purpose of groups like MADD is to influence public opinion-
in this case, against drinking and driving-and they are spending
considerable amounts of the money they and their corporate partners
raise to do so. In the usual course of this type of campaign, this spending
results in considerable skill and resources being directed toward
convincing the public that their particular crime interest remains at crisis
proportions and is thus in need of more attention. Not surprisingly,
MADD Canada's largest expense in 1995 was on "public awareness" at
43.5 per cent, or approximately one million dollars. Its next largest
expense, at 25.6 per cent, was administration and fundraising. One-
quarter of revenues to the cost of fundraising is considered high in
charity circles,63 but MADD utilizes a number of professional fundraising
techniques, such as commercial telephone soliciting firms, which
inevitably drive up costs (the telephone solicitor is usually paid on a
commission basis-there is no other affiliation with the charity or group
for which the canvasser is soliciting).64 So long as this strategy continues
to serve the interests of MADD'S directors and partners, and to provide
employment for a considerable staff, it is unlikely that MADD will declare
its campaign successful and shut itself down. It is more likely that it will
62 See MADD annual report, 1995: Great Progress on the Long Road to Success (Mississauga,
Ont.: MADD Canada, 1996).
63 The guidelines formulated by the National Charities Information Bureau in the United
States advise that fundraising expenses be "reasonable" with regards current and future needs:
Standards in Philanthropy (New York: National Charities Information Bureau, 1988). See also
CBBB Standards for Charitable Solicitations (Washington, D.C.: Philanthropic Advisory Service of
the Council of Better Business Bureaus, 1982).
64 See, for example, Connecticut Office of the Attorney General, Press Release, "Telephone
Solicitation Raises Consumers' Questions" (10 February 1997).
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switch focus and develop new issues and tackle new problems.65 At the
moment, however, drunk driving is still a "growth crime." 66 In Ontario
in 1995-96, 15 per cent of all cases brought to adult court were for
impaired driving charges.67 Drunk driving and the campaign against it
are also commanding significant public resources. The Ontario Ministry
of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services provided $1.2 million
in specific grants to police in 1995-96 simply to fund the overtime cost of
street-stop enforcement programs such as "Reduce Impaired Driving
Everwhere" (RIDE), and the Ministry of the Attorney General funds a
"Drinking/Driving Countermeasures Office."
There is evidence, however, that something is working.
According to information from the Canadian Centre for Justice
Statistics, the number of persons charged with respect to total traffic
enforcement declined from 249,733 in 1995 to 149,032 in 1997; much of
the decline was in alchohol-related offences. We will never know
whether some part or all of this decline would have occurred anyway as
lifestyles and an aging population lead to declines in alcohol
consumption and improved driver skill and safety. What is clear is that
once groups like MADD are in place and entrenched, and programs like
RIDE are operating, spending levels and organizational commitments
decline extremely slowly.
Groups like MADD are obviously not feminist, and do not even fit
well into the victims'-rights camp, but the utilization of the image of
mothers as well as the grief and anger of those who have lost loved ones
to senseless drunk driving deaths make them an important exemplar.
However more classic victims' groups also use female images while they
draw more explicitly upon feminist concerns about unredressed and
ongoing violence against women in their homes and within their intimate
relationships. Both the moral legitimacy of the "good" victim and the
discourse of feminist analysis are being appropriated by the alliance of
victims' movements and the New Right.
Both are apparent in the promotion of victims and a "victims'
rights bill" by both the federal Reform Party and the Ontario
65 "Drunk-driving fight hits high gear. Police, brewers join demands for tougher laws" The
Toronto Star (27 July 1998) A6. For a look at how other interest groups reshape their agendas and
continue their campaigns, see S.A. Holmes, "Good Times are Bad for Interest Groups" The New
York Times, Week in Review (26 July 1998) 3.
66 Crime generally is a growth industry. Spending on police services in Canada between
1988-89 and 1992-93 has risen from $4.39 to $5.72 billion. In 1992-93, spending on policing was one
and one-half times greater than all other justice costs combined: A Graphical Overview of Crime,
supra note 13 at 152.
6 7 Canadian Crime Statistics, 1995, supra note 20.
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Progressive Conservative government. In the Reform Party platform
booklet, A Fresh Start,68 the party promises to "shift the balance from the
rights of criminals to the rights of victims and law-abiding citizens. If
you are a victim, we will put you first ... ." The booklet, also asserts what
feminists have been claiming for years, that "our impersonal system
often forgets that crime is not just a matter between the accused and the
Crown." Similarly, in a newsletter published by the Ontario Progressive
Conservative party, "Promises Made, Promises Kept: Two-Year Major
Milestones of the Harris Government," 69 the government boasts of its
accomplishments in enacting a Victims' Bill of Rights (December 1995),
in investing $10.2 million into Victim/Witness Assistance programs and
in establishing tougher standards with respect to parole decisions. On
the latter initiative, it makes the appalling, and unexamined claim: "As a
result, for the first time ever, parole is being denied more often that it's
granted." The government, otherwise devoted to cost-cutting and tax
breaks, goes so far as to state as a good thing even for cost cutters, that it
has given money to shelters for battered women to provide safer
facilities, and more money to "support women and their families in
breaking the cycle of violence."70
The appeal of these issues to legislators and politicians is
obvious. For politicians who want to be elected, and for those who want
to remain in power, the "crime card" has always had appeal, particularly
as a distraction from other less popular initiatives.7 1 On the one hand,
rising expectations about rights and entitlements,7 2 let alone
expectations about employment and living conditions, are not readily
met. On the other hand, serious harms continue to be inflicted on the
68 Supra note 46 at 15.
69 It was sent out with cover letter dated July 15, 1997.
70 Ibid. The claims are ironic given the size of cuts to all social spending that has been the
hallmark of this administration. For a look at similar values expressed by several American
organizations that can be found on the Internet, see Justice Against Crime Talking at
http:llusers.deltanet.com/users/ghc, and Texans for Equal Justice at http:llwww.flex.net/-judge.
71 The Ontario government's recent initiatives against young offenders have been identified by
a political pollster as "a good issue for the PCs to trot out as an election issue because it tends to
appeal more to the PC voters. ... Everybody likes a tough stance on crime. ... If the PCs want to
make it an issue and say, 'Look, the place has gone to hell in a hand basket,' they could possibly do
that": J. Rusk, "Tory panel wants to crack down on Ontario's youth crime. Tough position may be
sound election strategy, pollster says" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (2 June 1998) A7. In view of a
"gender gap" in popularity, it is not unreasonable to infer that the continued focus on crime has a
political purpose: see J. Coyle, "Gender gap widening for Tories" The Toronto Star (5 May 1988)
B1.
72 See "Rising Expectations," supra note 56.
[VOL 36 NO. I
Retribution Revisited
vulnerable; harms that the justice system does not appear able to
prevent. The solution to this seemingly insoluble dilemma that has been
attractive to legislators has been to agree to system changes demanded
by an ever more powerful victims' movement and by the more punitive
element of the women's movement, in apparent attentiveness to
community voices and concerns. Equally, governments often will initiate
or suggest punitive solutions to problems that either do not exist in any
urgent sense, or were presented by victims in quite another context.
However, it is a safe assumption that any initiative announced will
reinforce a message of concern over the "crime problem," and/or the
interests of crime victims. 73
Initiatives like these continue to be claimed as part of the
"important steps" the Ontario government has taken "to protect
communities and crime victims." In a pamphlet mailed in June 1998 to
all residents in Ontario, entitled "Are We on the Right Track?", the
government quotes Priscilla DeVilliers, president of Canadians Against
Violence Everywhere Advocating its Termination (CAVEAT) as saying,
"Safety in the community is more than the absence of injury. We need to
look at the culture of fear-it's simply unacceptable." In response to
this ambiguous assertion, the government describes six initiatives that
have produced "more safety on our streets, less violence in our schools."
The initiatives described are highly unlikely to in any way contribute to
this laudable goal, but they are expressed as if they were effective
responses to real problems. The first adopts a labeling/scapegoating
response to the fear and prejudice that sexual offenders in particular
attract: "A new law will allow police to warn communities of dangerous
offenders and will prevent convicted criminals from changing their
names to hide past records."
The second describes the "boot camp" experiments in evocative
terms, that falsely imply that all young offenders now receive this
73 The Ontario government has targeted young people in particular, picking up on an
undercurrent of fear and anger directed toward youthful offenders. Announcements about tough
measures against young offenders have been regular, and a "Crime Control Commission has been
established headed by a trio of backbenchers (Jim Brown, Gerry Martiniuk and and Bob Wood)
who have all described experiences with young offenders that frightened them." See J. Armstrong,
"Tough boot camp rules to spread. Young offenders to face stricter conditions" The Toronto Star (9
December 1997) Al; J. Ruimy, "Tough stand taken on youth crime. Panel of MPs to recommend
initiatives" The Toronto Star (31 January 1998) A6; and J. Duncanson, "3 welcome debate on crime.
Tory Mrrs stand behind get tough stance" The Toronto Star (23 March 1998) E5. The federal
government's stand is generally "softer," but equally well directed toward the victim lobby, in a
recent announcement about a victim help centre: see D. Ferguson, "Ottawa plans oasis for victims
of violence. 'One-stop' centre to offer comfort and counselling" The Toronto Star (21 April 1998)
A7.
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"treatment," and, that previous programmes (now thankfully dispensed
with) focussed on trivial "coddling": "Young offenders are now held in
strict discipline programs that emphasize education and responsibility,
not entertainment and recreation."74
The third initiative describes the policy of rarely granting parole,
and thus holding prisoners to the end of their sentences to be released
without supervision or follow up, in the following terms: "The parole
process for provincial inmates has been cleaned up, resulting in a drop in
the crime rate among parolees."75
The last three "steps" are not in fact actions already taken, but
rather are plans or promises, without detail, to register pedophiles and
sex offenders, to have "greater protection for victims of domestic
violence and increased safety on urban streets and in schools," and to
support law enforcement officers "who protect our lives and safety at the
risk of their own." In a document mailed to voters in a pre-election year,
it may not be surprising that grand claims are made, with little detail.
What is of significance is the unrelentingly punitive and retributive tone.
There is a similar appeal in the "crime card" to corporate
interests, who have been seeking aggressively a diminished role for
government, while claiming that the private sector-which must include
them--can better serve "legitimate" social and community needs. A law
74 [Emphasis added]. The "boot camp" or "strict discipline" approach adopted as a centre
point of the Ontario government's crime strategy is controversial in at least two ways. First, the first
"camp" is also the first private prison in Ontario, and the company chosen to operate it is reported
to have a somewhat spotty record in the American facilities it previously operated: see S. Anderson,
"Boot camp honchos defend us record. Firm they worked for lost Florida corrections gig after jail
riot" Now (14-20 August 1997) 26. Second, and even more serious, the approach was introduced
before study of the option was completed and reported, and plans made to expand it in the face of
problems with the pilot "camp." The haste suggests an ideological and political motivation: see J.
Rusk, "Tough rules planned for youth offenders. Province considers using boot-camp-style
discipline for all young people in system. He believes in retributive justice. He has little interest in
rehabilitation" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (4 September 1997) A6; J. Armstrong, "Boot camp to
get even tougher: Ontario vows to go on with plans despite problems" The Toronto Star (4
September 1997) Al; S. Anderson, "Boot camps don't work? Tories still pushing them. Solicitor
General Bob Runciman didn't wait for study before backing camps. u.s. data indicates strict
discipline only makes youth reoffend" Now (19-25 March 1998) 26; and S. Prochownik, "Boot
camps breed rebels, not citizens" The Toronto Star (6 March 1998) A23.
75 [Emphasis added]. Given a drop in the number of parolees, it is almost inevitable the
crimes committed would also drop. However, the strategy has a more serious flaw. The prediction
of dangerousness or risk for recidivism is not a science, and efforts to make predictions are seriously
flawed. A recent study on the federal policy of denying selected prisoners not only parole, but also
release based on earned remission of sentence, was reportedly failing "miserably to predict those
most likely to reoffena": K. Makin, "Early-release law a failure, study says. Inmates rejected for
parole are not the ones most likely to reoffend, researcher says" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (14
October 1997) A3.
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and order agenda that increases surveillance and control of the
underclass and directs justice resources toward street crime (and away
from "crime in the suites"), while allying with apparently progressive
issues such as reducing crime against women and increasing rights for
crime victims has obvious public relations value. More directly,
privatization strategies are opening up the corrections "market" to for-
profit operations. This is a trend that began in Britain, and the United
States,76 gained significance in Australia77 and is spreading to Canada as
companies build and operate prisons and youth facilities and contract-
out prison labour, while communities look forward to the jobs and
spending a new prison represents. 78 The attraction for the women's
movement-at least that part that has become committed to
criminalization strategies-and for the victim's movement, is also clear:
access to the levers of power, funding when public sources of support are
disappearing, and considerable public support and discussion of issues
that for too long were ignored and relegated to the "private" domain.
V. CONCLUSION: NEW DIRECTIONS
Communitarianism without rights is dangerous. Rights without community are vacuous.
Rights will only have meaning as claims the rich can occasionally assert in courts of law
unless community disapproval can be mobilized against those who trample the rights of
76 There is a considerable literature discussing and assessing this trend. For example, see: J.J.
DiJulio Jr., "What's Wrong with Private Prisons" (Summer 1988) 92 Pub. Interest 66; J.G. Di Panio,
"Private Prisons: Can They Work? Panopticon in the Twenty-first Century" (1995) 21 New Eng. J.
on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 171; and S. Frazier Stacy, "Capitalist Punishment: The Wisdom and
Propriety of Private Prisons" (1991) 70 Neb. L. Rev. 900. Concerning the British experience see C.
Graham, "Privatization-The United Kingdom Experience (Comparative Models of Privatization:
Paradigms and Politics)" (1995) 21 Brook. J. Int'l L. 185; and M. Ryan, "Evaluating and
Responding to Private Prisons in the United Kingdom" (1993) 21 Int'l J. Soc. of L. 319.
77 D. McDonald & D. Biles, "Who Gets Locked Up? The Australian Police Custody Survey"
(1991) 24 Aust. & N.Z. J. Criminology 190; R. Midford, "Imprisonment: The Aboriginal Experience
in Western Australia" (1988) 21 Aust. & N.Z. J. Criminology 168; and P. Moyle, "Privatization of
Prisons in New South Wales and Queensland: A Review of Some Key Developments in Australia"
(1993) 32 Howard J. Crim. Just. 231.
78 J. Gandy & L. Hurl, "Private Sector Involvement in Prison Industries: Options and Issues,"
29 Can. J. Criminology 185; D. Girard, "Firms to bid on offender centres" The Toronto Star (6
February 1998) A4; J. Armstrong, "Penetang, Lindsay chosen for mega-jails" (9 October 1997) The
Toronto Star AS; and J.R. Finlay, "Town's lust to host jails is desperate" The Toronto Star (20
August 1997) A23.
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others. Restorative justice can enliven rights as active cultural accomplishments when
rights talk cascades down from law into community justice. 79
Feminist analysis has catalogued many of the failures of the
criminal justice system, but it is not enough to identify the false promises
of universality, equality, and effectiveness. The insidious promise of
deterrence as a promoter of safety and retribution as the only means to
public acknowledgement of a wrong must also be exposed, both in
theory and in practice, particularly if the early goal of transforming
abusive institutions is to have any chance of success. New models for
measuring the effectiveness of interventions are needed, as are new
approaches to the harm that patriarchy does to us all. When violence is
perpetrated and perpetuated, and trust is abused, there is a clear need
for an intervention that provides safety and restores peace. Beyond
immediate security considerations, the need for a clear and public
acknowledgement of the wrong that has been done is a legitimate and
indeed fundamental need of any crime victim. The ultimate false
promise lies in the identification of punishment/retribution with that
recognition. At the same time, those who abuse, and the communities
that condone or ignore their conduct must change; the false promise that
punishment will achieve that change must be more than acknowledged;
and the understanding must be incorporated in new strategies. One
source of new insights and new strategies is to look to other progressive
movements concerned with criminal justice, such as the movement for
restorative/transformative justice.
The essential destructiveness of retribution-based
acknowledgement of harm is particularly clear when one considers the
situation of the battered wife who wants the violence to stop but who
does not wish, or cannot afford (or both), to end the relationship. The
criminalization approach that has become the official norm of responses
79 J. Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing an Immodest Theory and a Pessimistic Theory
(Paper prepared for the course; "Restorative 'Justice: Theory and Practice in Criminal Law and
Business Regulation," Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1997) [unpublished] at 76.
Braithwaite's most recent research has persuaded him that the great potential of the restorative
justice movement, while it has not been realized, remains a possibility; hence the "immodest theory"
of how to transform the system. However, individual rights of victims, accused, and offenders can
be seriously harmed in communally-based models that do not have adequate safeguards, and, are
being harmed in some of the experiments; hence, the "pessimistic theory." He concludes that more
and better research and models, and very careful attention to the needs of victims and the rights of
the accused are needed to ensure success for, or alterations to, the restorative justice model. For a
critique that suggests the idea of "restorative" justice does not go far enough-given that for many
offenders there is no community to restore them to and given the realities of racism and
classism-and thus the goal must be transformative justice, see R. Morris, Penal Abolition, The
Practical Choice: A Practical Manual on PenalAbolition (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1995).
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to battering8 0 pits her against her spouse in a contest that individualizes
and depoliticizes spousal violence, and threatens her family in
fundamental ways. An immediate threat is posed by her partner's
inevitable loss of employment if the substantial prison terms called for
are imposed.8 1 A feminist response should not be to say to this woman,
"You are mistaken in your opinion of the harms that may be done to you
by the criminal process. You are mistaken in choosing family integrity
over the integrity of the justice system. You are mistaken in relying
upon your own opinion about how to deal with your situation and not
that of the police or the prosecutor or the counsellor or the expert."
These are patronizing and presumptuous attitudes that also alienate
women who might benefit from discussing them further and that drive
women away from the resources and help they might need. For women
who do not want their relationships with accused batterers to continue,
similar pressures operate to prevent them from avoiding the criminal
route, and preserving their privacy and some retained dignity about their
personal lives (and mistakes). It is not enough to say "you shouldn't feel
that way," many women do not want to admit that they are battered in
an adversarial court, where all that they can expect is a form of
punishment imposed on their partner. What, then, is the solution?
Leaving men to batter and their partners to deal with it alone is clearly
not an acceptable answer. One initiative that has potential is the Family
Group Conference model, both as it was developed in New Zealand and
as it has evolved elsewhere-for example in Australia and in
Newfoundland and Labrador.8 2
Instead of placing the criminal prosecution front and centre, the
Family Group Conference approach uses it as a fall-back tool for the
recalcitrant man who will not cooperate or who fails to honour the
conditions of the alternate disposition. Instead of an accusatory
adversarial contest as the first stage, if the abuser acknowledges
responsibility for the assault, Family Group Conference relies on a
consensus-building "circle" of all the relevant participants, the "family"
of any given set of participants, whoever they might be. The wrong is
acknowledged within this circle of the significant people in a couple's
80 See discussion supra notes 14, 22.
81 For others, see Martin & Mosher, supra note 22.
82 One discussion of the potential for this approach is discussed in J. Braithwaite & K. Daly,
"Masculinities, Violence and Communitarian Control" in T. Newburn & E. A. Stanko, eds., Just
Boys Doing Business: Men, Masculinity and Crime (London: Routledge, 1994) 189. The entire
collection is an example of what I mean by the need for newly invigorated analyses. See also supra
note 38 concerning the Newfoundland and Labrador experiment.
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lives, and ways to heal and restore both the perpetrator and the victim
are identified and implemented. The process is a true alternative, but
not a panacea; there are also real problems with these responses, and
significant limitations.
It is not a solution, for example, when there has not been an
admission of guilt, or willingness to accept responsibility for the conduct.
Although an admission is a necessary limit on the cases that are
appropriate for conferencing, it has at least two risks associated with it.
Because the "carrot" to encourage participation in something like a
Family Group Conference is that usually the likelihood of a prison
sentence will be avoided, there will be some men who participate
without actually accepting responsibility. Of that group, a minority will
actually be factually innocent. In either case (innocent but not willing or
able to contest guilt, or guilty but rationalizing), participation as a
convenience weakens the transformative potential. There are similar
problems when victims participate because of community or institutional
pressure, which can be substantial.
Some of these issues were considered recently by Julie Stubbs of
the University of Sydney. Stubbs recognizes the political and conceptual
dilemmas facing feminists who advocate reliance on the criminal justice
system to protect women from violence, such as the criminal justice
system's bias and differential impact on marginalized accused (and
victims), and the expansion of coercive powers that has resulted from
women's involvement with these reforms. However, she also assumes
that women need recourse to the criminal justice system for protection,
and she disagrees with the proposition that criminal justice intervention
is inevitably oppressive or unjust.83
She makes two important points. First, successful experiences
with an "evolved" criminal justice apparatus are possible, and second,
serious problems exist in alternative models such as Family Group
Conferences. The "successes" to which Stubbs points are the experience
of four remote First Nations communities in Northern Ontario with
policing, particularly around domestic violence, and experiences in
Hamilton, New Zealand, with an integrated police/community response
to wife assault. She uses these two examples to illustrate the flaw in
83 "'Communitarian' Conferencing and Violence Against Women: A Cautionary Note" in
Valverde etal, eds., supra note 37, 260. She is critiquing M.H. Ruttenberg, "A Feminist Critique of
Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy" (1994) 2 Am.
U.J. Gender & L. 171; and L. Snider, supra note 14. A more fully devoloped critique of all of the
"restorative" justice claims has been developed by John Braithwaite, the Australian criminologist
whose theoretical work on republican criminology has been so important in the development of
justice alternatives: see Reintegration, supra note 18.
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making sweeping claims against criminal justice intervention. She
continues her inquiry by critiquing the New Zealand Family Group
Conference as an inappropriate alternative to a criminalization strategy
or, at least, a most problematic one and examines the results of the
evaluations of Family Group Conferences conducted by Gabrielle
Maxwell and Allison Morris.8 4
A feminist critique of this type of alternative is of great value, as
is a feminist response to it. Stubbs raises valid concerns. She identifies
correctly the risk that a victim's participation in a conference may not be
truly voluntary-particularly a concern in small, closed communities.
She weakens her critique, however, by claiming that it is not clear on
what basis advocates assert that community conferences will be less
traumatic for women than court. A question like this fails to address the
real issues with involuntary participation in any process--criminal
prosecutions, mediations or Family Group Conferences. For a woman
who would find the power differentials in a mediation-style forum
difficult, court would be a nightmare-and is. For most people, and that
definitely includes victims of wife abuse, court is tremendously
traumatic. It is in part that trauma that sustains and nourishes victims'
rights claims and supports.8S5 A serious problem in a related vein flows
from the fact that it is too easy to underestimate how traumatic a
litigated resolution to a legally constructed issue really is, and that it is so
for all witnesses and complainants. Her last point is that it is not clear
that women would prefer the Family Group Conference to court. She
cites her own research that identifies women as needing the support of a
skilled advocate and the anonymity of court in order to proceed. The
issue of anonymity is undoubtedly the case for some (who, nonetheless,
do not have any options to compare with), but is definitely not true for
all. Moreover, assistance of an advocate is helpful in any process and
should be a part of all Family Group Conferences (as they are in
Newfoundland and Labrador). Finally, Stubbs's critical concern about
the reliance of this strategy on the police misses the point that she
herself makes about the continued necessity of reliance on the criminal
justice system. Surely the involvement of the police, inevitable if one
changes nothing in the process except to offer more support (one of the
options she indirectly supports) cannot be worse in a community-based
model. In fact, it is one of the strengths of Family Group Conferences
and one of the ways it may claim a place out of the margins and into the
84 Family, Victims and Culture: Youth Justice in New Zealand (Wellington, N.Z.: Social Policy
Agency and Institute of Criminology: Victoria University of Wellington, 1993).
85 See supra notes 7, 28, and accompanying text.
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centre where it may successfully challenge retributive models.
Ultimately, what is important is that the process that developed
initiatives like Family Group Conferencing as an alternate response to
wife abuse, as well as other initiatives such as the ones Stubbs describes,
point a way for feminist theorists and activists to find a way out of the
retribution trap. Initiatives like these, it seems to me, widen the circle of
theory and alliances in important ways. Alliances with penal
abolitionists, defence lawyers, and associations concerned with wrongful
convictions, and with the peacekeepers of Aboriginal societies can point
to new directions for activism. Incorporating theories and perspectives
from critical and republican criminology, critical race studies, and other
progressive schools will help to ensure fewer unintended consequences.
